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Introduction 
Melancholy as it may be to dwell on old splendors when the  present is uninspiring, the task of 
examining the  past  for  clues about recent diflculties is indispensable in the Argentine case. 
-  Carlos R Diaz Alejandro 
In a short span of a few golden years, with their peak from around 1900  to 1913, 
Argentines enjoyed a Belle Epoque. A visitor to Buenos Aires then would have 
marveled at the splendors of the city and, beyond it, the economic vitality of its 
hinterland:  the gleaming opera house, the graceful architecture, the expansive 
and efficient railway system, and a vibrant agricultural economy on the pampas 
linked to a sophisticated urban and industrial center. Today, the visitor sees the 
same elegant faqades, but decadence has long set in after decades of stagnant 
economic performance; society struggles  with an economy and an infrastructure 
that appear, in places at least, to have seen little renewal since the remarkable 
efflorescence of those distant glory days. 
Knowing that their ancestors once lived in one of the richest countries in 
the world is, naturally, of little comfort to today’s Argentines as they come to 
terms with their country’s  descent into the middle or lower echelons of the global 
economic rankings. Unable to hide from the past, confronted with reminders of 
the gilded age on every street corner, Argentines display a widespread curiosity 
about their own economic history and a near-obsession with that epic malaise 
may have contributed,  in no small measure, to the popular angst that gives 
Buenos Aires its reputation as the therapy capital of the world. 
Argentine economic history is, in short, the story of a decline unparalleled 
in modern  times.  The country was fortunate  to have begun the twentieth 
century as  one of the most prosperous countries in the world; to quote the 
legendary economic historian Diaz Alejandro again, “to have called Argentina 
‘underdeveloped’  in the sense that word has today would have been considered 
laughable. Not only was per capita income high, but its growth rate was one of 
the highest in the world.”’ 
1. Diaz Alejandro (1970, p. 1). 
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The basis for those high incomes was a fortuitous mix of now well-known 
ingredients:  a relatively literate and skilled population of immigrant stock, a 
seamless integration  of domestic and world economies in trade through rail 
and shipping connections on land and sea, eventual success in the adoption 
of the gold standard that brought stability and credibility, and, last but not 
least, an unbelievably high  resource-per-worker ratio in the form of a vast 
expanse of fertile agricultural land on the thinly populated pampas.  What 
could possibly derail that successful combination of institutions, endowments, 
and global economic conditions? 
Well, for a start, what had prevented success from coming sooner? In fact, 
prosperity had not been a foregone conclusion.  After the  1810 revolution 
brought independence from Spain, the former Viceroyalty of the River Plate, 
like the rest of Latin America, hoped for peace and progress. Instead, as else- 
where, decades were lost to war: first for independence, then over territory with 
newly created neighboring states, and even within the borders themselves. In- 
ternal conflicts simmered longest, as Buenos Aires argued with rival provinces 
over the political and economic contours of a slow-to-emerge federal compact. 
The ongoing belligerence put a brake on economic development, due to the 
fiscal costs of military action and the uncertainty that affected all long-term 
economic decisions in such a fissiparous political environment. Not until fifty 
years later was a unified national government firmly established under President 
BartolomC Mitre (1862-68), who was succeeded in mostly orderly transitions 
by the elected administrations of Presidents Doming0 Sarmiento (1868-74), 
Nicolas Avellaneda (1874-80),  and Julio Roca (1880-86): 
All  four presidents were modernizers.  Their ability to serve full terms in 
a somewhat democratic system stood in stark contrast to the often tenuous 
and volatile shifts of power that had previously obtained under the rule of 
various factions and their strongmen, the caudillos.  It was this old order of 
“barbarism”(barbarie) that Sarmiento, in particular, aspired to replace with “civ- 
ilization” (civiZizacion)-as  explained in his passionate and trenchant critique of 
Argentine society and its institutions, Civilizacion i barbaric, commonly known 
as Facundo. By civilization, he meant a European type of society, one centered 
on learning, good government, institution building, and economic stability. Be- 
yond just importing new habits, customs, dress, and sensibility, he knew that 
the possibilities for development depended most of all on economic integration 
with Europe and the wider world, on attracting foreign migrants and capital, 
and engaging the world in trade so as to exploit the comparative advantage of 
Argentina to the full. It  was an ambitious program perhaps, but in retrospect 
one can only be impressed by what was accomplished in the years between 
2. For the historical background of the period see Botana (1986), Rock (1987), and Gallo (1997). 
For a less detailed view see Luna (2000). A comprehensive treatment of economic and social 
ideas in the period is to be found in Halperin Donghi (1977) and Botana and Gallo (1997). Introduction  5 
the Republic’s fiftieth and one hundredth anniversaries. Albeit with some false 
starts, the modernizers’vision of the future did take shape in the late nineteenth 
century and the country rose to new heights of economic achievement. 
A century later the optimism has long dissipated. Argentines wonder if they 
will ever unleash the economic potential that once seemed to promise them a 
bright future as one of the most advanced countries in the world.  Will this 
remain a longing, a yearning, an unfulfilled hope?  History can be our guide 
as we examine the crucial transition from growth to relative retardation in the 
early twentieth century, an era that sheds light on the origins of Argentina’s 
mysterious slide into economic underdevelopment.  In this book we do not 
claim to offer cures for melancholy and nostalgia, nor treatment for any forms 
of depression (at least of the noneconomic kind).  Still-in  economics as in 
therapy-the  first step is to understand the source of the ailment, even if the 
remaining eleven steps are a matter for other professionals. 
For those with a personal or historical interest in Argentina, our bookwill try 
to provide some answers to a question we often hear from people in various walks 
of life: “given its past success, how did Argentina end up like this today?” That 
is the puzzle. It is a simple question, without a simple answer, but it resonates 
all the way from our conversations with nonspecialists to controversies at the 
cutting edge of academic research.  In recent years, theoretical and empirical 
work in the study of economic growth has focused heavily on concepts of long- 
run convergence in per capita income.  Argentina offers a different lesson, an 
example par excellence of big-time divergence.  Hence, for scholars, our study 
informs a continuing debate on growth, its essential economic sources and its 
institutional preconditions. 
Before us we have a rare and curious specimen: a once relatively rich country 
that has become relatively poor, as we shall see next in a section that looks at 
the cross-country evidence. In accounting for this, we do not seek to offer a 
monocausal explanation or even a deterministic line. Much of what has hap- 
pened to Argentina’s economy properly fds  under the rubric of politics, and 
unpredictable internal and external shocks have surely left their mark too. Our 
account seeks to be sensitive  to political-economyforces and cognizant ofthe  oc- 
casionally random and exogenous events that have disturbed the economy. But 
we do aim to expose the particularly important role of macroeconomic stability, 
and to that end we explore in a moment the record of price and exchange-rate 
volatility in Argentina, also in comparative perspective. These initial forays into 
the statistical evidence expose the central theme of the book while sketching 
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The  Long-run Context: Economic Growth in Two Centuries 
The puzzle of Argentine economic growth in the long run can be neatly encap- 
sulated by looking at its level of economic development around four benchmark 
dates: the year 1820, a date in the early nineteenth century shortly after inde- 
pendence; the year 1870, a date in the middle of the “long nineteenth century”; 
the year  1913, a date at the end of the “long nineteenth century” and at the 
zenith of the Belle Epoque; and the present, where we can use the latest cross- 
country evidence available.  Studies of historical income allow us to address 
a central question in world history: whether the income divergence between 
developing economies (the “periphery”) and the developed world (the “core”) 
is a “new”  phenomenon, a legacy of the industrial and postindustrial twentieth 
century, or whether it dates back to 1800 or even earlier. 
Around 1800,  according to Coatsworth‘s pioneering attempt to put together 
comparative historical estimates of per capita incomes in Latin America, Ar- 
gentina, or at least that part of it occupied by Europeans, had an income level 
well above that of its neighbors in the region, and similar to the levels seen in 
Europe or the United States at that time. More precisely, Coatsworth estimates 
Argentine per capita income at 102 percent of the U.S. level in 1800, compared 
to 66 percent for the region as a whole. For a broader comparison, Maddison 
places U.S. per capita income at $1,287 in 1820 (in 1992 international dollars, 
used henceforth in this section), compared to $1,228 in Western Europe, and 
$1,236 in the “Western Offshoots’’ (meaning Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
and the United States). This would place Argentina at about $1,300 per capita 
if it were still at 102 percent of the U.S level in 1820, the region as a whole 
at roughly $900. Essentially, Argentina was then a relatively rich country, but 
others in the region were poor-or  poorer, if 66 percent of the U.S. level cannot 
be called poor, as is the case today3 
Did Argentina maintain this superiority in incomes? Despite early evidence 
of “Argentine exceptionalism”  a new trend emerged in the mid-nineteenth cen- 
tury. The  core economies’growth accelerated as the industrial revolution spread; 
but Latin America, beset by wars and economic chaos, stood still, or even fell 
backward. By 1870  Western European incomes had risen to $1,986 per capita, 
and the offshoots to $2,748.  But Argentine per capita income still stood at 
$1,300 per capita five decades later, and the region as a whole at about $800. 
Argentina was still richer than its neighbors, by roughly the same amount, but 
it had not kept up with the core. It was at around this time, of course, that the 
postindependence wars ended, and aspirations for economic development that 
3. Maddison (1995), Coatsworth (1999).  In 1800 Coatsworth found Cuba had a per capita 
income of 112 percent of the US. level, but we exclude this island economy, so dependent on 
slave-produced sugar, from the comparison of mainland countries.  In 1820 Maddison found 
that the world leader was Britain, the first industrial nation, with an income of $1,756 per 
capita, with the Nethedands second at $1,561, and Australia third at $1,528. Introduction  7 
would close this gap took shape. Remarkably, the dreams started to come true: 
in several Latin American countries, including Mexico and Chile, but most no- 
ticeably in Argentina, there was an acceleration in economic growth rates after 
1870  that implied a convergence on the core economies. For example, from the 
1880s to 1913,Argentina  had an average growth rate of 5 percent per annum in 
output, or about half that in per capita terms. This was a stunning performance 
by the standards of the time and sparked a flourishing of Argentine confidence 
at the height ofits golden age. Maddison’s data suggest that by 1900  Argentina’s 
income per capita had risen from about 67 percent of developed-country levels 
in 1870,  to 90 percent in 1900, and 100  percent in 1913. In Figure 1.1  we get a 
more complete picture by comparing Argentine performance to a wide sample 
of countries from 1820 to the present.  By 1913 it must have seemed that the 
process of convergence was almost complete and Argentina had established a 
clear lead in income levels over the rest of the region? 
These trends surely fostered the idea that Argentina had become an “ad- 
vanced” economy, differentiating herself from its “backward” neighbors. How 
advanced?  Though historical data give some margin for error, there is little 
doubt that the 1913 income level was inferior to those of the richest “countries 
of recent settlement” such as  the United  States, Canada, and Australia, and 
also below that of the first industrializer, Great Britain. But the Argentine level 
of $3,797 in 1913 slightly surpassed the levels in many middle-income Euro- 
pean economies at the time, such as France ($3,452), Germany ($3,134), and 
Netherlands ($3,533), and was eclipsed only by the United Kingdom ($5,032) 
and the four Western Offshoots, notably the United States ($5,307) and Aus- 
tralia ($5,505); and it was well above the levels in poorer Southern European 
countries such as Italy ($2,507) and Spain ($2,255)-as  would be expected, 
since these were the very countries supplying Argentina with so many of its 
immigrants.  All  things considered, and given the vagaries of historical data, 
some scholars have placed Argentina’s 1913 income level clearly in the world 
Top 10, even the Top 5.  Whatever its exact status in 1913, for all  practical 
purposes Argentina was an advanced ~ountry.~ 
The stage was then set for the dlnouement and a dramatic reversal of fortune 
in the twentieth century.  Economic growth in Latin America lagged behind 
the core OECD countries, and the performance ofArgentina was worse still. A 
regression of disturbing proportions is clearly visible in Figure 1.1. Argentina’s 
ratio of 80 percent of OECD income levels in 1913 accords this date great 
historical significance as the time when Argentina was as close as it ever came 
4.  In the text  and in the figure we use a weighted average of Western Europe plus Western 
Offshoots plus Japan (a pseudo-OECD subset) as a measure of developed-country levels of 
income per capita. 
5. Our modern-day perspective comes from the data of Maddison (1995), but those witness to 
events in this period were not unaware of Argentina’s elevated status, as we know from sources 
such as Mulhall(l903). Figure 1.1. Comparative Economic Development 








1820  1840  1860  1880  1900  1920  1940  1960  1980  2000 
Argentina  Latin America 
Western Europe  European New World 
-X-  Southern Europe  -USA  -  UK  -Japan  -  S. Korea  -Taiwan 
1820  1870  1900  1913  1950  1973  1992 
Argentina  1,300’  1,311  2,756  3,797  4,987  7,970  7,616 
Latin America (7)  900’  783  1,311  1,733  3,478  5,017  5,949 
Western Europe (12)  1,228  1,986  2,899  3,482  5,513  11,694  17,412 
Western Offshoots (4)  1,236  2,748  3,868  5,051  8,083  13,828  17,475 
Southern Europe (5)  -  1,194  1,676  1,788  2,259  6,770  10,015 
United States  1,287  2,457  4,096  5,307  9,573  16,607  21,558 
United Kingdom  1,756  3,263  4,593  5,032  6,847  11,992  15,738 
Japan  704  741  1,135  1,334  1,873  11,017  19,425 
South Korea  -  -  850  948  876  2,840  10,010 
Taiwan  -  -  759  794  922  3,669  11,590 
Western Europe (12): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Nether- 
lands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
Southern Europe (5):  Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey. 
European New World (4, called “Western Offshoots” by  Maddison): Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, United States. 
Latin America (7): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela. 
Notes andsources: Data in the table from Maddison (1995) in 1992 PPP-adjusted interna- 
tional dollars, except for the 1820  entries for Argentina and Latin America from the estimates 
in the text. Figure shows incomes relative to a Western Europe arithmetic average equal to 
1  .O.  Thejgure  shows relative rather than absolute economic performance. Introduction  9 
to joining the “club of core economies.  Ever since, the income trend has 
been down and away from the OECD level, with a reversion back toward the 
average of Latin America as a whole. Argentina’s ratio to OECD income fell 
to 84 percent in 1950,65  percent in 1973, and to a mere 43 percent in 1987, 
not so far above the regional average of 34 percent.  By then, any old notions 
of Argentine exceptionalism had been thoroughly and painfully debunked, at 
least for those willing to confront this uncomfortable reality and examine the 
statistical record. 
Argentina makes a fascinating subject for historical scrutiny precisely be- 
cause it experienced such a unique and pronounced rise and fall in its long-run 
economic status. In  this respect, it has little in common with the legions of less- 
developed countries that have always been relatively poor and never managed 
to make a transition to sustained modern economic growth, for no one denies 
that Argentina was a very rich economy in 1900-1913.  It also has little in 
common here with that much smaller group of poor and peripheral economies 
that have made a transition to developed-country status and have not, as yet, 
relinquished that gain; by taking a long view, we may include here such once- 
peripheral European countries as Norway, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and 
Ireland, and Asian examples such as the striking case of Japan, as well as more 
recent emerging market successes in South Korea and Taiwan, countries that 
have lately eclipsed Argentina in per capita income (Figure 1.1). 
In sum, a visitor from Buenos Aires in the early- or mid-nineteenth century, 
transported to the present, might see nothing strange about Argentina’s lowly 
economic position and its similarity to that of the region as a whole.  Indeed, 
the time traveler might be astonished to hear from one of today’s locals how 
close Argentina came to achieving economic success, if not “civilization,”  in the 
intervening period. This is not to say that the modern Argentine would enjoy 
telling the story: surely, more than being relatively poor, the acutest source of 
melancholy is the knowledge of how close you once were to having it made. 
The  Central Problem: Macroeconomic Stability  in the Long Run 
If we accept that Argentina made a fleeting jump toward a high level of devel- 
opment at the turn of the twentieth century, we must next ask what formed the 
springboard. As we have noted, there were many factors working together to 
promote Argentine success in this era, including an abundant resource endow- 
ments and a fortuitous position in a globalizing world. Yet, from a comparative 
standpoint, there is not much uniquely Argentine about these factors, and, in 
many cases, little that is specific to the period 1880-1913.  Other economies, 
like the countries of recent settlement, also had great resources and could exploit 
their comparative advantage in global markets.  But they fared better, sooner, 
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interwar period, it was still the case, in the long run, that they recovered and 
prospered more. Many comparison countries did not wait so long to grow rich 
in the late nineteenth century, and none has since seen its economy fizzle out. 
Accordingly, we must seek some peculiarly Argentinean characteristics that 
mark the period  1880-1913  as particularly auspicious for economic growth, 
focusing on factors that have been conspicuously absent before or since. It is 
our thesis that such factors-explicitly,  shifts in economic policies directly under 
the control of the authorities-set  the stage for the fleeting years of success. A 
cursory look at the historical statistics of Argentina should, we argue, point 
a finger of suspicion at the record of macroeconomic instability as  a crucial 
detriment to sustained economic growth and long-run convergence. 
In the long run, a key macroeconomic challenge for a small open economy is 
the task of building institutions and commitments to support stable monetary 
and fiscal policies.  If such actions are successful, an economy can gain price 
stability for the long run-in  other words, a firm nominal anchor-and  all of 
the benefits that go with it in terms of reputation and expectation effects that 
enhance efficiency in financial markets, contracting, and so forth.  If such ac- 
tions fail, an economy risks a volatile inflation rate, financial instability, and an 
increased exposure to banking and currency crises. 
A goal of the book is to explore the causes of success and failure in this 
realm, but for initial motivation we discuss some of the problems encountered. 
It would be desirable here to examine detailed measures of the government’s 
actions in fiscal and monetary affairs,  looking at  the  record ofbudgets  and money 
supplies and other key variables.  For succinctness, and since few consistent 
data series exist for two centuries, we confine our introduction on this topic to 
two important statistical measures of stability that are relevant in a small open 
economy: the price level and the exchange rate! 
It is worth taking a moment first to reflect on the remarkable stability of 
the period 1880-1913  by looking at events in subsequent history, from 1914 
to the present.  We see from Figure 1.2 that Argentina’s capacity to generate 
inflation has remained high in the twentieth century, as compared with selected 
OECD countries. The evolution of both the price level and the exchange rate 
tell the same story:  after  1940, the end point of our study, the capacity of 
the economy to hold a stable level of any nominal variable-that  is, to have a 
nominal anchor-was  lost. The purpose of our book is to explain the origins 
of that state of macroeconomic drift by examining policy tensions in the years 
prior-at  a time when the anchor was not yet lost, but was under considerable 
strain. 
Some more detailed figures drive home the change of regime. Median infla- 
tion for 1940-97  in Argentina was 28 percent per annum with a maximum of 
6. These two variables are potentially related, as in the purchasing-power parity (PPP) theory of 
exchange rates. We  explore that topic for Argentina in Appendix 4. Figure 1.2. Prices and Exchange Rates, 1880-1996 
-  Argentina 
-Great  Britain 
-United  States 
1880  1900  1920 
log Exchange Rate 
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log Exchange Rate 
1940  1960  1980  2000 
Notes: The natural log of the price level (CPI) and exchange rate (currency units per 
U.S. dollar) are shown, with a normalization such that 1913 log level equals zero. 
Sources: Obstfeld and Taylor (2002). 12  Straining at the Anchor 
3,084 percent (during the 1989-90 hyperinflation). The exchange rate moved 
similarly. The same statistics are 3 and 14  percent, respectively, in the United 
States. But as is clear from the figure, from around 1900  until 1939,  the Argen- 
tine economy moved very much in synchronization with leading core economies 
in terms of its price level and exchange rate stability. In the decade before the 
First World War prices were almost perfectly stable, with a mild inflation in all 
countries on the gold standard due to new gold discoveries injecting liquidity 
into the world economy at a faster rate than output growth. After the outbreak 
ofwar Argentina kept its exchange rate at least as steady as the other countries 
with respect to the U.S. dollar and experienced slightly better inflation per- 
formance than some: a 1.8 percent average 1914-39  versus 1.6 percent in the 
United States, and 2.2 percent in Britain (for further comparison, the figures 
were 1.3 percent in Australia, and 1.2 percent in Canada). Only after 1940 did 
the real trouble begin, and Argentina’s postwar inflation problem endured, at 
least until the “convertibility plan” of the 1990s was implemented by Finance 
Minister Doming0 Cavallo-and,  as the figure shows, this event finally put a 
halt to the instability. 
Initial Conditions: Postcolonial Economic Disarray 
Argentine history from independence until the 1860s  was punctuated by a series 
ofwars between a barely unified set of provinces, and there is no way to speak of 
a coherent set of national economic policies in that era. The times were heavy 
with economic chaos, political uncertainty, and fiscal pressure.  With weak 
government structures at all levels, and a well-functioning bureaucracy taking a 
back seat to a well-functioning army, all the authorities resorted to the simplest 
and most reliable form of revenue creation:  money printing.  Seigniorage, or 
the inflation tax, was their key fiscal tool in times of crisis and, worse still, each 
province had its own money. As a result, price and exchange rate stability could 
never be credibly established.  We see evidence of this in Figure 1.3, which 
shows some data for the most important province, administration, monetary 
system, and economic unit: Buenos Aires. During major wars and blockades, 
the local currency regularly devalued by several multiples.  A series of high 
inflation episodes left the paper currency seriously suspect as a store of value, a 
precursor of the twentieth century experience. 
It is illustrative to compare this inflation record with the stability seen in 
other economies under different monetary arrangements.  Take, for example, 
the United  States and the United  Kingdom.  Both were committed  to the 
gold standard throughout  this period:  the British resuming in 1821 shortly 
after the end of the Napoleonic Wars  and remaining on the standard until 
the First World War began in 1914; the United States over roughly the same 
period absent one major break during the Civil War, when convertibility was Introduction  13 
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-Price  level - U.S. 
w 
1820  1830  1840  1850  1860  1870  1880 
Notes and sources;  Series for U.S.  and U.K. price levels are taken from Global Financial Data 
http://www.globalfindata.com; the primary sources are Lindert-Williamson  and Bowley for 
United Kingdom, and Warren-Pearson for United States; these are index numbers on an ar- 
bitrary scale.  The series for the U.S.4J.K. exchange rate (dollars per pound) is from Officer 
(2001).  The series for Argentine exchange rate (paper pesos per pesosfuerte) and price level 
(price index for hides 1829-51,  implicit price of exports 1864-79)  are from Dikguez (1972), 
Irigoin (2000a), and della Paolera (1983). The  two  disjoint Argentine price level series are not 
commensurate, and each is on an arbitrary scale. 
suspended from 1861 to 1878.7 In the United Kingdom the gold value of the 
currency never wavered from its legal mint value; in the United States, except 
for the years of  suspension, the price level was  stable and the dollar-pound 
exchange rate remained very close to par at $4.86 (Figure 1.3). The result in 
both countries was an extended period of price stability,  excluding the U.S. Civil 
War, with low average levels of inflation, and low volatility. The contrast with 
the Argentine case is dramatic, and graphically illustrates the macroeconomic 
benefits of peace, political order, and institutional stability. 
In the 1860s and 1870s, some stability came to Argentina in terms of the 
political solutions developed and also in terms of economic outcomes.  Once 
the wars were at an end, the first three national administrations presided over 
years of low and stable inflation, as can be seen fromTable 1.1.  The  later Mitre 
7. See Officer (1996) 14  Straining at the Anchor 
Table 1.1. Argentine Infation, 2820-2 935 
Period  Events  Inflation Rate (percent per annum) 
1820-30  war  20-22 
1830-38  0 
183842  war  25-45 
184245  -11 
1845-48  war  14 
1848-61  4 
1861-64  war  9 
1864-67  -15 
1875-78  9 
1884-89  8 
1889-91  48 
1891-99  6 
1914-18  13 
1918-27  -3 
1929-34  0 
Sources:  Amaral(l988); Irigoin (1995); Bordo and Vigh (1998); della Paolera (1988,1994). 
1867-75  gold standard  0 
1878-84  gold standard  -4 
1899-1913  gold standard  3 
1927-29  gold standard  -1 
years, 1864-67,  were even notable for a sharp defation, when a credible effort 
to end inflation led to a boost in money demand even as the money supply 
remained more or less fixed-a  textbook illustration of one of the pitfalls of 
stabilization. Efforts to attain a respectable and stable monetary regime in this 
period aimed at the single, preferred model that was sweeping the globe at the 
time, namely the gold standard. The  Argentine authorities were enthusiastically 
aiming to embrace a particular set of policy choices that required discipline of 
a kind that had not been seen before, and central here were the commitments 
to fixed exchange rates and internationally open capital markets that were the 
sine  qua non of the gold standard. They felt that it was only under this kind of 
commitment that price stability could be guaranteed over the long run. 
Disappointingly, the first two attempts to set up a gold standard soon came 
a cropper, as can be seen from the table. We argue that, despite some success 
in keeping inflation low in the 1860s and 1870s,  an agreement in theory on the 
ideal monetary arrangement could not produce lasting success until adequate 
reforms introduced more robustness and consistency in the underlying mon- 
etary, fiscal, and banking institutions.  In boom times it proved easy to paper 
over the cracks, and such issues as nonexistent bank regulation or the absence 
of central control over money issues could be viewed in a relaxed way. 
As our story opens, we spend some time discussing  the ill omens of this period 
of ad hoc policies and the spectacular macroeconomic disaster that followed Introduction  15 
from them.  When the relatively stable price record of the 1860s and 1870s 
gave way to a resurgence of inflation and instability in the late 1880s, a major 
crisis unfolded whose aftereffects took many years to die down. It  was a shock 
that threatened to put Argentina on a different track than the group of advanced 
economies, with a return to high inflation and questions over its ability to run 
a responsible gold-standard  monetary policy (see Figure  1.2 and Table 1.1). 
When inflation peaked in 1890-91 at around 50 percent per annum a stable 
future looked in grave doubt. 
Faced with a make-or-break  scenario, the policy reaction to the 1890 crisis 
succeeded in averting a meltdown and provides a pivotal event for our narrative, 
a decisive step that changed the course ofArgentine economic history, and still, 
through its influence on the design of Cavallo's convertibility plan, is making 
itself felt today.  The shock precipitated a deep institutional reform, a debate 
over optimal monetary and fiscal policies, and raised serious questions as  to 
the soundness of the economy's financial architecture.  More than a century 
has passed without diminishing the relevance of these considerations in any 
developing-country environment, as recent calamities in the global economy 
can attest. 
This book speaks directly to present-day debates on the merits of opening 
capital markets, managing exchange rate regimes, and coping with the tradeoffs 
and constraints that are the occupational hazards of any small open economy 
in a globalized world. In the late 1880s, Argentina made one kind of tradeoff: 
it faced  a tough choice as external capital markets tightened  and economic 
growth slowed. The authorities could not simultaneously finance the budget, 
meet convertibility requirements, and allow free capital movements without a 
severe monetary contraction and the likelihood of acute financial distress. They 
balked at that kind of discipline, their commitment slipped, the exchange rate 
floated, and a crisis ensued. Not  just any kind of crisis, but one that looks eerily 
familiar from our contemporary perspective-the  very first crisis ever seen of a 
new and particularly dangerous kind. 
A Pivotal Event: The  First Emerging Market Crisis? 
The foundation for the crisis was deep. The fiscal use of money creation was 
the norm in postindependence Argentina from the 1820s to the 1880s,  when 
crises and wars exhausted the limited tax take and domestic and foreign credit 
was unavailable.  State and provincial banks acted as money printers to their 
respective governments, and in this period of"monetary anarchy" multiple banks 
of issue constantly wrestled with pressures to overissue notes. 
To  try to stabilize the price level, a convertibility commitment was  made 
in  1881, but it proved short-lived  because the government  never decisively 
limited note issues. The  government held back from regulating the banks and, 16  Straining at the Anchor 
perhaps not coincidentally,  did not escape from its own fiscal dependence on the 
banks’ generous issues of credit. The banks of issue continued to print money 
to finance government deficits and engaged in falsification of balance sheets, 
loans to politicians, and other dubious practices.  Gold reserve losses soon 
mounted.  After 1884 a temporary “dirty float” of the paper-gold  exchange 
rate was announced, but the gold drain continued because there had been no 
reforms in the underlying fiscal and monetary policy “fundamentals.” Attempts 
to fix the banking laws were ineffective, even counterproductive, since without 
fundamental reform the practice of making loans based on political expediency 
would continue. 
Contemporary parallels cannot be avoided here. Foreign investors were not 
unaware of the seamy side of Argentine finance, and what in Asia today has 
been dubbed “crony  capitalism”  was in the Argentina ofyesteryear disparagingly 
referred to as “Gaucho  banking” by the horrified Anglo-Saxon observers of that 
time: 
[The Argentine banks] were free banks in the freest sense of the term, for any Gaucho 
who had the political open sesame to them could ask for almost anything he pleased, 
and it would be given him so long as there was a piastre left in the till! 
Given such common underpinnings then and now we should not be surprised to 
see a common outcome, and the Argentine fiasco ended in a classic speculative 
attack with no gold left in the vaults whatsoever. 
By 1890 an infamous macroeconomic and financial downturn, the so-called 
Baring Crisis, was underway. It  involved some very familiar ingredients that we 
have seen so often in recent collapses: a fiscal gap, an unsustainable commitment 
to a fixed exchange rate peg, and poorly regulated banks that borrowed short 
abroad in gold and lent long domestically in pesos? We now know that these 
ingredients form a dangerous mix:  an incipient violation of the intertemporal 
budget constraint by the government  triggers an inconsistency in the three- 
way compromise between a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility, and policy 
activism-the  “trilemma,” a topic we explore below. This was, in essence, the 
first modern emerging market crisis, and fits well with the textbook theoretical 
descriptions of such crises. 
How  did the public react to these events? External and internal credit markets 
virtually shut down.  Furthermore, there was a dramatic internal shift away 
from holding the rapidly depreciating domestic paper money, and a shift to 
holding gold as currency. In the early 1880s currency in the hands of the public 
was almost 100 percent paper pesos; in the thick of the crisis it was about 80 
percent gold. Such a phenomenon of currency substitution is now very familiar 
8. These words from the English financial correspondent W. R. Lawson in his article “Gaucho 
9. The  principal foreign creditor was Baring Brothers, a major London bank, hence the name. 
banking” in the Bunker? Muguzine of 1891 (p. 38), quoted in Ford (1962, p.  100). Introduction  17 
to macroeconomists working in Latin America, given the frequent postwar 
dollarization of the regions' economies during hyperinflation crises. The 1890 
experience of Argentina stands out in history as one of the earliest and most 
dramatic of such episodes, one that was echoed again in Argentina's 1989-90 
hyperinflationary crisis almost exactly a century later.  As  the flight to hard 
currency took place the banking sector was devastated by widespread failures, 
and inflation surged.  The currency devalued rapidly and economic activity 
contracted sharply. 
In both decades of the nineties, Argentina was emerging from long periods of 
macroeconomic instability. Monetary and fiscal policies had been brought into 
disrepute by years of inconsistency. The domestic currency had been devalued 
more times than anyone could remember.  A rapidly globalizing world stood 
by, ready to offer the benefits of open goods and capital markets, but unsure 
of the trustworthiness of the local economic policy regime.  Then and now, 
new order was imposed on the country by a radical restructuring of the money 
and banking system, and a preference for fiscal rectitude.  The problem of 
inflationary monetary policy was solved by a rigid convertibility commitment, 
specifically via a currency board arrangement. 
An  Institution as an Anchor: The  Currency Board 
We have seen that the twentieth-century Argentine inflation record looks like a 
throwback to the worst moments of the nineteenth century-only  much worse, 
with some severe spikes as in the hyperinflations of the 1980s and early 1990s 
that boost the averages. The eventual cure also came as a blast from the past: 
facing similar monetary problems, Cavallo's plan was  explicitly modeled on 
the rigid and credible monetary institution that had been the foundation for 
the only episode of monetary stability in the history of Argentina:  a currency 
board, or as it was called then, the Caja de  Conversidn, or Conversion Office, 
that operated from 1890 until 1935. The Conversion Office had a simple and 
easily monitored task to exchange gold in its reserves for paper currency, and 
vice versa, at a fixed exchange rate, and to otherwise exercise no independent 
or autonomous monetary policy functions. Currency boards, particularly as the 
ratio of gold reserves to paper issues approaches 100 percent, become fail-safe 
methods to guarantee  the convertibility of the paper currency in circulation 
(also known as the monetary base, high-powered money, or outside money). 
It is this institution, the world's first full-fledged currency board in an inde- 
pendent country, that forms the centerpiece of our book.'"  Argentina stands 
10. In the nineteenth century, currency boards were otherwise employed only in a few small and 
isolated island economies, all of them within the British Empire, namely Mauritius in 1849, 
Ceylon in 1884, the Straits Settlements in 1889, and the FalMand Islands (Zslus Mulvinas) in 
1899. For a look at the fascinating early history of currency boards see Schwartz (1993). 18  Straining  at  the Anchor 
as the leading historical exemplar of this particular form of monetary experi- 
ment, both in the past and in the present. In both eras, the new regime helped 
to solve reputational problems, both at home and abroad, to the extent that 
it “tied the hands” of the government.  Given the current success of the Ar- 
gentine economic plan since 1990, the country stands as a prototype for other 
would-be reformers around the world, especially those enamored of rules over 
discretion in monetary policy, for whom the currency board, or even complete 
dollarization, looks like an attractive regime choice. 
The difficulty here is that the present Argentine currency board tells only 
one story, and an unfinished one at that. Questions are left unanswered: Will 
this institution endure?  Can it fulfill all its promises?  Have we seen it at its 
best or at its worst so far? Under what circumstances might it face difficulties 
or even collapse? These are vital questions, and, short of peering into a crystal 
ball, they can only be answered by peering into the murkier depths of the past 
to get a glimpse of how similar institutions have succeeded and failed. In the 
historicallaboratorywe can ask questions that inform our present situation: Was 
Argentina’s search for macroeconomic stability successful in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century?  How did changing domestic and international 
conditions affect the outcome? What political economy obstacles stood in the 
way and how were they surmounted, if at all? How do these events speak to 
the current challenges facing developing countries in a similar environment 
today?  In this context, our book is not just about Argentina, not just about 
the period 1880 to 1935. It is concerned with one of the essential problems of 
economic development, and asks what history can teach us about how to solve 
that problem through particular economic policy choices. 
The  Major Themes: An Overview of the Book 
The approach we adopt is that of a case study, blending empirical, historical, 
and theoretical styles in the tradition of quantitative economic and institutional 
history, to explore the macroeconomic history of Argentina from 1880  to 1935. 
These years marked the rise and fall of the country’s first great convertibility 
experiment.” The outline that follows considers several factors that influenced 
this trajectory and introduces the major themes of the book. 
11. The  systematic study ofhgentine  monetary and financial  history is aphenomenonofrecent  and 
growing interest. Among the most prominent new historical works are those by Fishlow (1985); 
Amaral(l988);  Cortts Conde (1989); Regalsky (1994); della Paolera and Ortiz (1995); Bordo 
and Vtgh (1998); Irigoin (1999,2OOOa,2000b); andNakamura and Zarazaga(1999). We might 
also add our own articles on which parts ofthe  present book are based (della Paolera 1988,1994; 
della Paolera and Taylor 1999a, 1999b, 1999~).  These studies, in their more formal examination 
of the behavior of monetary and financial institutions in an open peripheral economy, build on 
the earlier classic works by Williams (1920), Prebisch (1922), and Ford (1962). Introduction  19 
Political Economy Dynamics 
An overarching aim of our study is to understand the key economic and political 
actors, their objectives and constraints. We will focus on several types of agent in 
the economy and their interaction: the government authorities, both fiscal and 
monetary, and the potential conflicts between the two; the banks, both public 
and private; the general public; and the external sector, the rest of the world, 
especially the international capital market. What conditioned the behavior of 
these various parties?  Here we have a second aim, to map the contours  of 
the institutional landscape. But this landscape, as we shall see, was constantly 
changing. 
The  government, in some sense, was the first to move by setting the “rules of 
the game”-that  is, the monetary regime and its objective, banking regulations, 
and the more general institutional framework in the economy. However, the 
government also faced constraints on these choices, notably the intertemporal, 
or long-run, government budget constraint.  Fiscal strength or weakness can 
interact with the monetary regime via  the need for seigniorage, that is, the 
inflation tax. This was an important  feature ofpostindependence Argentina and 
derived from poor tax capabilities and the inability to issue debt domestically 
to the public, or globally to the world capital market. The choice of monetary 
regime determined the path of exchange rates and prices via the constraints (or 
lack thereof) on monetary policy. This in turn shaped banking behavior, and, 
along with bank regulations (or  lack thereof) determined when credit would be 
easy or tight, how boom and bust cycles would evolve. 
Given the actions of the state, how did other agents react? The public plays 
a key role through their willingness to hold  money, both currency (“outside 
money”) and bank deposits (“inside money”). Too much bad credit from banks 
would lead the public to substitute cash for banking deposits and, in an extreme 
case, set off a run on banks.  Too much inflation would encourage currency 
substitution-the  public would substitute gold or other “hard” assets for paper 
money and, in an extreme case, set off a run on the currency. There was clearly 
feedback on the fiscal position here: a run  from paper money dented seigniorage 
revenue, and bank weaknesses would impinge on fiscal expenditure if Lender- 
of-Last-Resort responsibilities were, implicitly or explicitly, a part of the “rules 
of the game.” 
Finally, while all  of these forces could operate within a closed economy, an 
external sector provided additional sources of feedback. Banks (when extending 
credit) and the government (when bridging a fiscal gap) might also have access 
to foreign capital-but  equally might not if a general economic and financial 
crisis were perceived, setting the stage for a typical emerging market type of 
crisis. Foreign lenders, sensing a default risk, or country risk, both in the banks 
and government balance sheets, could refuse to roll over credit, leaving both 20  Straining at the Anchor 
institutions scrambling for funds.  Besides adding directly to fiscal problems, 
this would further  raise the probability of bank runs  and failures and thus 
indirectly worsen the fiscal tension. The positive feedback allows expectations 
of such crises to be self-fulfilling. Seen as a structural feature of the monetary 
regime, the possibility of such events could be built into world capital markets' 
expectations ex ante, limiting the country's access to credit. In addition to this 
feedback from endogenous variables,  the external sector frequently imposed very 
severe shocks on this small open economy of an entirely exogenous character, 
shocks that were to be especially large and adverse after 1914, adding another 
layer to the story. 
This is  not quite the whole picture.  Given the above reactions by  agents 
within and beyond the domestic economy, one can then explore how the state, 
in turn, reacts and searches for improvements to the institutional structure. How 
do state objectives change and what are the political economy forces at work? 
Is inertia such as to allow a functional but inefficient institutional structure 
to persist? When an institutional structure fails, when a regime crumbles or is 
severely  tested by a crisis,  what gives? This sets up a kind of"institutional search" 
process that can roam far and wide, and our book is about exactly this kind of 
search in Argentina from the 1880s to the 1930s. We will  see how episodes of 
bold experiment with new institutions can transform the landscape for better 
or worse; how conservative adherence to old structures can assure stability or 
pose problems as economic conditions change. Sticking to the right path is an 
enduring challenge, as we know from the similar and recurrent problems faced 
by so many developing countries today. 
The Budget Constraint and the Trilemma 
Our discussion of the Baring Crisis sets the scene for our study by putting 
the spotlight on one of the major historical events of the period and drawing 
attention  to the significance of macroeconomic policy and outcomes.  How 
will  we approach the task of fitting this and other events into an analytical 
framework?  Our methodological  approach builds on several major strands 
of open-economy macroeconomic theory that deal with intertemporal policy 
choices, budget constraints, and consistency. 
One  major element in our study is public debt theory.I2 The  theory shows that 
if a government wants a good reputation in its two major liabilities, money and 
bonds, then the solvency of the government should never be in doubt. In detail, 
the monetary and fiscal authorities have an intertemporal budget constraint that 
needs to be respected. Attempts to violate this constraint, even in the short run, 
imply an inconsistency between monetary and fiscal policies and, hence, that 
12. Sargent (1986);  Calvo (1988). Introduction  21 
at some point the government will have to default-either  to money holders 
(by printing more money), or to bond holders (by reneging on debts), or both. 
This offers an easy route to bad macroeconomic outcomes, such as inflation, 
exchange-rate crises, default on public debts, loss  of credit-worthiness,  and 
even financial crashes.  Since these symptoms are so widely seen in the annals 
of Argentine history, this theory is highly relevant. 
Another major element in our book is the choice of a monetary regime as a 
nominal anchor. Since money is a government liability and a source of revenues, 
the public debt problem is obviously closely related to price and exchange-rate 
stability. But the precise form of anchoring matters a great deal for what policy- 
makers can and cannot do: the policy may target a price or an exchange rate and 
the commitment might be via a rigid rule or may allow considerable discretion. 
The exact form of the policy will determine whether there is any exchange-rate 
flexibility and whether the country has any independent monetary policy at 
all. The  macroeconomic policy trilemma summarizes the main tradeoffs in this 
sphere. Policymakers can only choose two out of three objectives from the list 
of fixed exchange rates, capital mobility, and activist monetary  Clearly, 
as Argentina struggled with its nominal anchor choice and its commitment to 
the gold standard during our period of study, these tradeoffs were of central 
concern. 
Still, history shows that, despite all of the external volatility of the period, 
by and large Argentina remained committed to open markets before the 1930s. 
If openness is assumed, the trilemma reduces to a dilemma: a choice between 
fixed exchange rates and activist monetary policy.  Both were tried at various 
times, despite the existence of the Conversion Office, a currency board with a 
seemingly very hard rule. The tensions were at their highest during times of 
financial stress for the simple reason that the dilemma then tookon a particularly 
threatening form. Argentina had a fractional-reserve banking system, but, given 
the currency board rules, no Lender of Last Resort. The monetary (and fiscal) 
flexibility required to provide liquidity to banks in distress simply did not exist 
as a result of this institutional design. 
The dilemma was thus all  about the conflict between goals of “internal con- 
vertibility” (of bank deposits into currency) and “external convertibility” (of 
currency into gold at a fked par).  In a floating rate system, the tension can 
be solved since the monetary authority can use discretion to inject money as a 
way to stave off an incipient banking crisis. Adjustment comes via the price of 
outside money, via the external value of the currency, or the exchange rate; note 
that-as  is usually, but not necessarily, the case-there  was no scope for pricing 
inside money, the bank deposits. But in a fixed rate system, there is no easy way 
out since there is no such discretion available. 
13. On the trilernma, and its historical manifestations, see Obstfeld and Taylor (1998). 22  Straining  at the  Anchor 
This set of contradictions, we argue, eventually compromised the whole sys- 
tem. But, as we will discuss in our concluding chapter, the experience is more 
than just a historical curiosity. The challenges faced by Argentina raise ques- 
tions about the choice of monetary standards and the institutional design of 
traditional banking systems. They throw light on contemporary debates such 
as the benefits of currency boards and dollarization, and may prompt careful 
consideration of neglected alternatives such as the narrow banking model. All of 
the same technical problems challenge monetary and financial stability around 
the global economy today. 
The Search  for a Monetary Authority and the Global Context 
A monetary standard can be defined as  a set of transparent monetary rules 
designed to govern the evolution of key nominal variables such as price levels, 
nominal exchange rates, and nominal interest rates.  Rules can then be cho- 
sen to govern monetary expansions and provide a credible framework which 
guarantees a minimum of inflation. Early Argentine monetary history reveals 
considerable instability in the type of monetary regime adopted. A search was 
under way for a credible monetary regime, with several attempts to adopt the 
gold standard, as we saw in Table 1.1. Here, Table 1.2 sets out in more detail 
the major institutional developments during our period of study. 
It  is important to see the Argentine record in comparative perspective. Prior 
to the First World War, most core countries,  and an increasing number  of 
countries at the periphery, adopted the gold standard-a  monetary rule that, if 
credible, offered some promise of committing monetary authorities to a price- 
stability 0bjecti~e.I~  The  gold standard required three basic policies to function 
adequately: a fixed value for the domestic currency in terms of gold set by the 
monetary authority; the free mobility of convertible foreign exchange or specie; 
and the establishment ofrules relating the quantity of money in circulation with 
the stock of specie. 
The ramifications of nominal exchange-rate stability for domestic price sta- 
bility depended on the operation of the forces of purchasing power parity and 
price stability in the rest of the world, and on the real and monetary adjustment 
mechanisms that mediated these forces at home. For a small country, open to 
the movement of goods and capital as Argentina was at the time, a fixed ex- 
change rate anchored the domestic price level of internationally tradable goods 
to world levels.'' 
The  alternative to such a convertible regime is an inconvertible regime. Under 
an inconvertible monetary standard, the bills and coins issued by the monetary 
14. On the adoption of the gold standard in this period see Eichengreen (1996, ch. 1). 
15. On the workings of purchasing power parity (PPP) in the gold standard era see McCloskey 
and Zecher (1976). On PPP in a longer run context see Taylor (2001). Table 1.2. Monetary PoIiry Chronology 
Period Before Our Study 
1810-67  Floating exchange rate. Period of “monetary  anarchy” after independence. 
Rival provinces rail to unify; a single federal‘structure is postponed. Each 
province issues its own money through state banks, no central authority. 
Frequent foreign and civil wars lead to seigniorage abuse, chronic inflation. 
First national administration of Bartolome Mitre. Stable monetary policy 
causes deflation, with aim of gold convertibility. 
Fixed exchange rate. Convertibility under the auspices of an Exchange Office 
within the Banco de la Provinicia de Buenos Aires, but other banks maintain 
independence. System fails after adverse external shock in 1873 leads to gold 
drain and exposes contradictions in the system. 
1862-67 
1867-75 
1875-83  Floating exchange rate. 
Period Covered in Our Study 














Law 1130 proposes a metallic regime to end the “monetary anarchy” that had 
occurred under the auspices of multiple banks issuing paper money. 
Law 1130 implemented, gold standard established. 
Gold standard; par is 1  gold peso = 1  paper peso. 
Baring Crisis; fiscal use of money; inflation; collapse of convertibility; 
exchange rate begins to float and depreciates markedly. 
Law 2741 creates Conversion Office (Caja de Conversion),  with a monopoly 
over the emission of a new currency. 
Inconvertible paper currency. Floating exchange rate of paper to gold pesos. 
Macroeconomic reforms bring about stability and currency appreciation. 
Law 3871 (Convertibility Law) orders the Conversion Office to act as a 
currency board, and exchange gold pesos for paper pesos at a new par (2.27) 
for all transactions. Though initially having zero gold baclung for the currency 
in its vaults, Conversion Office accumulates gold rapidly after 1902. 
Gold standard; 1  gold peso = 2.27 paper pesos. 
Inconvertible paper currency. Floating exchange rate of paper to gold pesos. 
Gold flows at the Conversion Office limited to occasional government uses. 
Conversion Office continues to exchange gold pesos for paper pesos at new 
par (2.27) for these transactions. Laws 9479 and 9577 are passed in 1914, 
granting the Conversion Office and the Banco de la Naci6n permission to 
employ rediscounts for reasons of wartime emergency. Suspension occurs. 
Briefly, in 1925, the rediscounting facility is employed by the Conversion 
Office. The Banco de la Nacion makes extensive use of this facility. 
Gold standard resumes; 1  gold peso = 2.27 paper pesos. 
Inconvertible paper currency. Floating exchange rate of paper to gold pesos. 
Gold flows at the Conversion Office limited to fiscal uses (payment of 
government foreign debt). Conversion Office continues to exchange gold 
pesos for paper pesos at new par (2.27) for these transactions. 
Conversion Office deviates from its previous mechanical money creation rule 
and starts to rediscount commercial paper. An independent Argentine 
monetary policy resumes. 
Creation of the Central Bank (Banco Central). Takes over all assets and 
liabilities of the Conversion Office. Revalues gold stock according to 
prevailing market rate of exchange (new par is 4.96 versus 2.27). Uses 
proceeds-to  increase backing of &ney  base, and to bail out financial system. 
Discretionary monetary policy managed by Central Bank. Return of chronic 
inflation, with hyperinflations in 1980s. 
Return of currency board system: Cavallo’s convertibility plan. Price and 
exchange rate stability achieved. 
PeriodAfter Our Study 
1935-90 
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authority have no intrinsic value, nor are  they backed or guaranteed by  any 
external real object. They are, however, legal tender and must be accepted by 
the public in economic transactions.16 Under inconvertibility, the monetary 
authority has total discretionary powers over the nominal amount of money, 
and thus, in principle, over the price or exchange rate  at which this money 
would be exchanged for gold, for foreign currencies, and for domestic goods. 
Inconvertible regimes (that is, noncommodity monies) are now the norm. 
Almost all countries issue fiduciary money, with the world divided into countries 
that have a fixed exchange rate relative to some base currency and countries that 
have a flexible or floating rate of exchange. In contrast, from around 1880  until 
the Second World War,  the use of an inconvertible regime was  a matter of 
some disrepute.  Though floating was often useful as an emergency measure, 
convertibility was  prized  as  a policymaking goal and the gold standard was 
its accepted and preferred form.  In just  a moment, when we examine the 
reputational benefits of a credible convertible regime, we will see why. 
First, we pause to note how even supposedly unrestrained discretionary mon- 
etary policy can limit its own effectiveness in times of abuse, providing another 
motive for the embrace of a rule-based policy. Though couched in terms of a 
specific historical choice for Argentina, the same decision faces many develop- 
ing countries today as they weigh up the pros and cons of fixing their exchange 
rates or, going further, adopting a currency board or joining a currency union. 
Currency Substitution as  a Policy Restraint 
Without a rule-based monetary regime there are, nonetheless, some market- 
based limits to the discretion of policymakers and the extent to which they 
can abuse fiscal and monetary policy. Still, these limits appear only when the 
economy labors under very stressful conditions, and when the reaction of the 
public is such as to preclude further abuse. The Argentine government was to 
discover these limits in the crisis of 1890, a time when policy inconsistencies 
brought the use of paper money almost to a standstill and one of the world’s 
earliest episodes of capital fight taught an important lesson. 
The crisis had its origin in an ill-conceived domestic monetary and fiscal 
experiment:  the Law of National Guaranteed Banks.  In 1887, the federal 
government launched a new banking law in which any banking organization 
with a minimum required capital could issue paper notes backed by government 
gold bonds. The majority of these banks were national and mixed provincial- 
private banks, and to take part in the plan they floated foreign loans in Europe 
to purchase the national bonds with gold.  The scheme was thus a leveraged 
16. These standards were named by the Latin wordjut, which means “let it be done”-referring 
to the fact that such inconvertible monies are created by government command or decree. Introduction  25 
arbitrage operation by which foreign investors were implicitly partners in the 
business of issuing government guaranteed paper-money. 
Like so many schemes of that ilk, it appeared workable so long as foreign 
creditors were happy to go along-and,  critically, so long as all the supplemen- 
tary note issues were backed with 100 percent marginal bullion reserves.  But 
in the late 1880s capital inflows began to reverse and, as conditions tightened 
in early 1889, the government broke the rules of the game and decided to pay 
off in paper money part of the internal debt denominated in gold. The decision 
was tantamount to a partial default, and both foreign and domestic investors 
became reluctant to absorb more Argentine government debt. 
In Buenos Aires the public started to attack the paper peso. The  government 
decided to intervene with gold to support the paper peso so as to calm the 
expectations of devaluation, but it soon proved to be a futile defense and by 
1889 the government had lost almost 90 percent of its specie stock. The lack 
of coordination in monetary and fiscal policies resulted in an almost complete 
reallocation of specie from the banking system to the public and ultimately 
provoked the Baring Crisis. In  this historical instance, the currency substitution 
phenomenon could be defined, in modern terminology, as capital fight-not  in 
the sense that specie fled the country, but in the sense that the specie pocketed 
by the public was financed with government external debt. 
Having tested the limits of seigniorage and discretionary monetary policy and 
found them wanting, the government absorbed an important lesson. Ironically, 
once all the gold reserves had been spent, the currency question was definitively 
settled with the creation in 1890 of the Conversion Office, a currency board, 
as the sole monetary authority of Argentina, and the search for a centralized 
monetary authority ended, one might say, by default.” 
Monetary Credibility and the Capital Market 
We have seen that periods of convertibility were successful in bringing down 
inflation (Table 1.1). Later on, we will present  typical tests of purchasing 
power parity and confirm that during periods of convertibility Argentina was 
firmly anchored to the world price level.  But the adherence of Argentina to 
an internationally approved monetary regime like the Gold Standard was also 
17. The Conversion Office was created by Law 2741 of October 7, 1890, which took the note 
issue privileges away from the banks and effected the gradual conversion and amortization 
of the legal tender currency.  This law was promulgated by the Executive and later approved 
by  Congress (in November  1891).  However, there was no convertibility of notes into gold 
in 1890, that is, external convertibility; though this was announced as the ultimate goal, it 
was not formally established until the Law of Convertibility, Law 3871 of October 31, 1899. 
The differences between the two laws should be kept in mind:  the first law established the 
Conversion Office with its note issue prerogatives; the second was a law about how to conduct 
monetary and exchange policy within the already existing Conversion Office. See Table 1.2. 26  Straining at the Anchor 
a more subtle political-economy decision that had implications beyond just 
tethering domestic prices.18 
For a borrower country such as Argentina, a very important aspect of an 
efficient monetary standard is its ability to facilitate the integration of the lo- 
cal economy into world capital markets. In this way a capital-scarce domestic 
economy can take advantage of capital inflows, and foreign savings can con- 
tribute to long-run accumulation and economic growth. A transparent set of 
monetary rules designed to insure macroeconomic stability can limit the future 
discretion of the authorities to deviate from their precommitted policy. 
The credibility so generated should be reflected in the reduction of so-called 
country risk. This is the interest-rate premium charged by foreign borrowers, 
expanding the choice set ofthe  domestic economy through lower costs offinance 
and, via a reduction of credit rationing, through higher debt ceilings. In that 
sense too, the adoption of a metallic regime can be a welfare-improving strategy. 
One might ask if such welfare gains were realized. 
Contemporary emerging market analysts use bond spreads as a critical mea- 
sure of country risk, and we apply the same yardstick. We would like to know 
where Argentina’s spread stood in relation to the range seen in other markets, so 
we use the standard statistical method of the confidence interval, the mean plus 
or minus 2 standard deviations. Figure 1.4 suggests that a sound reputation did 
pay off in terms of reduced country risk in global capital markets. 
The figure is based on the spread between a long-term external government 
bond yield and the yield on the international benchmark bond of that era, the 
British consol, using data for those countries that had continuous quotations 
in London noted in The Economist newspaper. The “core and empire” group 
consists of putatively safe bonds  from eleven countries:  Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, 
Sweden, and the United  States.  The “periphery” group (on the same scale) 
consists of bonds issued by potentially more risky borrowers:  Chile, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy,  Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, and Uruguay. In the 1860s and 
1870s, the modernizing Argentina aspired to be treated like the borrowers in 
the first group, not like the emerging markets in the second group, and sought 
to reform policies to that end. Did this plan ~ucceed?~’ 
The two figures show that Argentina was treated like a member of the core 
during periods of convertibility,  or around such periods when the exchange rate 
18. This section on reputational effects, and the gold standard as a commitment device, draws on 
della Paolera (1994), Bordo and Kydland (1995), and Bordo and Rockoff (1996). 
19. Note that core and periphery  status was  not necessarily clear cut, and there were shifting 
boundaries between these two groups.  We chose a fixed set of countries, for simplicity, but 
even these groups present a moving target. The  core saw its spreads narrow as the gold standard 
coalesced after 1880 and usheredin the globalization of the capital market centered on London. 
The  periphery saw convergence, but volatility too. Its bond spreads waxed and waned, growing 
large duringglobal downturns, notably in the market tightenings of 1873 and 1890. Figure 1.4. Country Risk in Argentina, Core, and Periphery, 1870-1940 
Units: percentage point spread over U.K. consol yield. 
Notation: Heavy line = Argentina; Solid line with shaded area = mean plus or minus two stan- 
dard deviations for comparison group of bonds; Core and Empire = Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, and the United 
States. Periphery = Chile ,  Greece, Hungary, Italy,  Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, and Uruguay. 
Notes and sources:  Country risk is spread between a government external long bond yield and 
yield on British consols. Yields are based on the sterling coupon to price ratio in London. From 
Global Financial Data <http://www.globdfindata.com>  ,  except Argentina 1884-1913 from 
Appendix 1  (unlike the Global Financial Data we include here only federal bonds not in default). 
Primary data from The Economist. It is to be understood that bonds exhibiting a discount of 50 
percent or more, roughly corresponding to yield spreads in excess of 10 percentage points, were 
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was close enough to parity to indicate credibility (1868-75,  1880-89,  1900- 
1931); but when its commitments were in doubt it faced much higher bond 
spreads, like many other members of the periphery (1876-79,  1890-99, post- 
1932). When the convertibility experiment collapsed in 1875  Argentina’s bond 
spread roughly doubled, from about 4 percent to 8 percent. The  spread narrowed 
again in the 1880s when a new convertibility plan was announced, but when 
the spectacular Baring Crisis erupted all those efforts went up in smoke as the 
bond spread doubled again. Moreover, this is not to say that foreign loans were 
available at that rate after 1890-there  were no new loans for many years-but 
it reveals the secondary market’s perception of the country’s solvency problems. 
It can be seen in the lower figure that in 1890 Argentina was starting to 
look like an extreme point even by the standards of the periphery, rising more 
than 2 standard deviations above the mean bond spread in this reference group. 
This was just the kind of shameful position that the modernizers explicitly 
wanted  to avoid.  Those left to clean up the mess after the Baring  Crisis, 
particularly the interim President Carlos Pellegrini (1890-92),  had the repair 
of this sullied reputation at the top of their list of priorities. They had a long 
and arduous task ahead of them.  Even by 1899,  with the economy stable and 
the resumption of convertibiiity at hand, foreign observers remained skeptical 
that just by dint of some new monetary regime Argentina could rise above the 
bad habits of nineteenth-century Latin America, a world where political and 
economic instability seemed to go hand in hand: 
[South Americans] are always in trouble about their currency. Either it is too good for 
home use, or, as frequently happens, it is too bad for foreign exchange. Generally they 
have too much of it, but their own idea is that they never have enough.. .  the Argentines 
alter their currency almost as frequently as they change their presidents.. .  .  No people in 
the world take a keener interest in currency experiments than the Argentines?’ 
As  the upper part of Figure 1.4 shows, regaining the trust of world capital 
markets was a slow business of rebuilding confidence.  After 1890 the bond 
spread slowly converged down and into the 90 percent confidence interval (the 
mean plus 2 standard deviations) for the core and empire group.  Finally, in 
1913,  a date that here takes on yet more historical significance,  Argentina was 
a member of the club, a core economy, as measured on the risk dimension. 
The  interwar period also offers an interesting picture, since here the core itself 
started to become a riskier place, as a result of war, uncertainty, and economic 
fluctuations before and especially during the Great Depression.  By then Ar- 
gentina was looking like a very good risk indeed-a  somewhat Pyrrhic triumph, 
we would say, since global capital markets had imploded and credit rationing 
obstructed new bond issues in almost every year after 1913, except for a few 
20. This quote comes from the English correspondent W. R. Lawson again, in the Bunker) Mug- 
mine of 1899 (p. 691), quoted in Ford (1962, p.  90). Introduction  29 
successful forays into the New York market in the late 1920s and late 1930s. 
It is also striking that all bond spreads widened as the Great Depression rolled 
in during the early 1930s. For Argentina the major shock was a big jump in 
the bond spread after 1931, a date to keep in mind since it was the occasion 
of another major change in macroeconomic policy, the effective demise of the 
currency board system, a pivotal event at the conclusion of our study. 
Overall, it is fair to say that the adoption of a credible monetary regime 
represented a positive institutional innovation as measured by country risk, at 
least so long as global capital markets functioned smoothly. This was the case 
at least before 1913. At the cost of building up of a huge stock of international 
reserves to foster the credibility of the regime, Argentina obtained cheaper and 
better access to world capital markets, easing the constraints on investment and 
growth.  But when capital markets seized up after 1913, this particular cost- 
benefit calculation changed markedly: a low bond spread was of little use if no 
new bonds could be issued. 
Public Debt Credibility and the Capital Market 
Of course, monetary  regime credibility could only obtain if the underlying 
fiscal position was  also credible.  In order to maintain  fiscal credibility, the 
government  had to back all of its liabilities and not just the country’s money 
with a combination of specie and a solventjscalposition. Thus, for present- 
day market watchers monitoring a fixed exchange-rate regime, some of the key 
indicators to be watched are the evolution of the exchange rate, the backing 
in specie (or international reserves) of the monetary base, and measures of 
fiscal performance, ideally the evolution of deficits and the stock of public debt. 
Similarly, our understanding of the tensions of the Argentine fiscal-monetary 
nexus is not complete without some discussion of the overall policies relating 
to public debt management. 
In the 1880s boom the term “debt management” would be, perhaps, too kind, 
given the way fiscal gaps caused public sector borrowing to spiral quickly out of 
control. From 1881  to 1889 the fundedpublic  debt ofthe  provinces, mainlyheld 
by foreign investors, grew 746 percent in real terms?’ Over the same period the 
federal funded public debt grew 95 percent, an indication in and of itself of the 
extremely expansionary fiscal policy adopted by the administration of President 
Miguel Juirez Celman (1886-90).  It is hard to overemphasize the extent to 
which foreign investors began lending to all manner of new borrowers within 
this emerging market in a short space of time. The Province of Buenos Aires 
was the only province that, before the euphoria of the eighties, had had genuine 
access to international capital markets.  It was  in 1883 that the bandwagon 
21. Memorius de Hacienda (Treasury Reports; 1892, 1893). 30  Straining  at  the  Anchor 
started to roll: ten other provinces and ten municipalities floated their first long- 
term bonds in the London market.  By year’s end, the consolidated provincial 
external amounted to 35 percent of consolidated federal debt.  On the eve of 
the Baring Crisis in 1891, this proportion had climbed to 114  percent. 
By 1891 almost all municipal and provincial foreign debts were technically 
in default.  Only through the extraordinary leadership of Pellegrini did the 
national  government  avoid an across-the-board  default on its foreign debt. 
To be fair, he was  given some help in the form of a “bailout.”  In January 
1891 the Bank of England acted in ways akin to the IMF’s interventions in 
recent crises, advancing to the federal government  a three-year bridge loan 
of El5 million to cover the service and amortization  of external debt.  This 
did give Argentina a breathing space in which to work out an orderly set of 
rescheduling arrangements with its creditors, a diverse array of banks and other 
private bondholders; but it did not help that much and no new external credit 
was available for years in the private or public sectors. 
The  costs were serious and illustrate the importance of public debt credibility. 
From 1891  to 1902 Argentina suffered stringent credit rationing and financial 
isolation. The sudden collapse of foreign capital flows required drastic adjust- 
ments in the structure of the domestic economy, as was well understood at the 
time?’ Argentina had to endure austerity conditions so as to generate sizeable 
trade surpluses. But the impact went far beyond mere consumption effects: a 
decade of economic growth was effectively lost due to the sharp contraction 
of investment, a direct consequence of the withdrawal of foreign investment. 
The parallels with contemporary emerging market crises are striking: we are 
reminded that all aspects of domestic economic activity are compromised by 
such shocks. The standard of living may need to fall, and investment for the 
future may need to be halted too, all in order to solve this particular kind of 
“transfer problem.” 
DefZation,  Expectations, and  Investment 
The trauma of the Baring Crisis was to leave its mark on the design of new 
macroeconomic policies in the remainder of the decade. The  political-economy 
constraints of the moment produced an original, effective, but very costly eco- 
nomic phenomenon: deflation under a pure paper standard with a fixed money 
base. 
22. Jose Terry, one of the government’s leading financial experts, wrote shortly after the Baring 
Crisis that: “It is true that, after all, products must be settled with products; but it is also the 
case that a country can have a number of years in which it settles products with credit; the 
credit in that case represents the product to be exported in the future.. .here we can observe 
that, after any crisis in which the country loses external credit and capital, imports diminish 
considerably-because  Say’s law must then apply exactly, for in those moments there is neither 
money nor credit that could replace it.” (Terry 1893, pp. 64-68, our translation). Introduction  31 
In the Baring Crisis, the paper peso (peso moneda nacidnal(),  nominally equiv- 
alent to one gold dollar by virtue of the 1881 convertibility law, suffered a de- 
preciation of 274 percent. Despite this very severe misalignment, in 1893-and 
in the middle of delicate negotiations with international creditors to resolve the 
default-Argentine  monetary authorities assured investors that convertibility 
would be resumed at par. The Conversion Office had no backing to issue new 
money, so the stock of high-powered money was held fixed at its pre-crisis level 
for a decade. Once the inflation inertia of the crisis subsided a rapid deflation 
and appreciation ensued as money demand recovered. 
The deleterious effects of the deflation were soon felt, a direct result of this 
extraordinarily restrictive monetary policy.  In 1897  a political-economy debate 
began as to whether a return to a convertible monetary regime would be advis- 
able or not. The debate centered on whether the paper peso should be restored 
to convertibility at the original par or else at the then-prevailing market ex- 
change rate, thus accommodating the devaluation. Predictable divisions arose. 
Urban sectors and commercial interests favored a convertibility plan fixed at 
par while politically powerful rural interests were keen to see an end to the 
deflation and appreciation that squeezed their profits on exported agricultural 
and pastoral g00ds.Z~ 
Yet, ifwe can put distributional conflict aside, the most important arguments 
for devaluation centered on the damaging economy-wide effects of deflation for 
investment and economic growth. These concerns originated from the now- 
obscure Argentine political economist Silvio Gesell(1862-1930), whose works 
anticipated Fisher’s ideas on tight money, interest rates, and the problem of the 
debt-deflation  trap, and even the ideas of later scholars such as Mundell and 
Sargent on the importance of regime changes, expectations, and the impact of 
monetary policy via the real interest rate. Real interest rates were quite high in 
Argentina, averaging 10.4  percent in the 1892-99 period. In this sense, a looser 
monetary policy that accommodated the devaluation seemed, in principle, the 
appropriate course of action.  At the resumption in 1899, this was in fact the 
final outcome. 
Given the rigid monetary policy implemented in the early 1890s, we might 
ask what the tradeoffs were for policymakers. Here a comparative perspective 
can be informative, and in one thread running through the book we are careful 
to examine choices and outcomes in the 1890s crisis relative to later slumps in 
1913-19 and 1929-33. For example,  when we analyze how Argentina overcame 
the Great Depression, we emphasize a change in macroeconomic regime in 
1931 that destroyed prevailing deflationary expectations-but  also destroyed 
the nominal anchor and the years of investment in monetary regime credibility. 
23. Ford (1962). Such intersectoral conflicts  were common in all countries alreadyon,  or attempting 
to join, the gold standard. The  political divisions in the 1890s  United States offer a well-known, 
but not the only, example. See Eichengreen (1992a; 1992b) and Frieden (1988; 1997). 32  Straining at the Anchor 
Convertibility and the Financial System: Walking a Tightrope? 
The loss of financial intermediation in the 1890s imposed serious real costs 
on the Argentine economy in the short run.  The poorly designed banking 
system was left in tatters following the abortive boom and bust of the 1880s. 
In the longer run, however, we need to know what institutional and economic 
impediments hindered  the growth of a resilient financial system that could 
rekindle and sustain the process of domestically financed capital formation. 
The  postcrisis reconstruction was not smooth. In  spite ofa  diversified branch- 
banking system, and even when macroeconomic policy seemed under control, 
financial crises were still recurrent in Argentina. To explore this problem, we 
invoke the idea of the intertwined monetary and financial macroeconomic “twin 
risk” that confronts a small open economy under a fixed exchange-rate standard. 
Until 1935 the Argentine monetary and financial regime operated without 
a central bank. The modern conception of a central bank envisages an official 
bank with the monopoly right to issue money and the capacity to rediscount 
the financial system’s portfolio  of commercial obligations in order  to act as 
the system’s Lender of Last Resort.  Thus, a possible cause of a suboptimal 
financial structure was the existence of a less powerful (that  is, less discretionary) 
monetary authority. The Conversion Office, as a currency board, had a single, 
exclusive macroeconomic responsibility of guaranteeing the external value of 
the domestic currency. Certainly, it had no mandate to guarantee the internal 
convertibility of banlung deposits into cash in the event of general bank runs. 
Simply put, the Conversion Office could not act as  a Lender of Last Resort 
by providing unbacked currency to the financial system-at  least, not without 
breaking its own rules. 
A common characteristic of real financial crises is that a fall in bank money (or 
in the ratio of inside to outside money, due to a persistent run on bank deposits) 
coincides with a severe loss of output.  The story for 1913-14  is compelling 
and exposes the weakness of the “one size fits all” monetary policy that the 
currency board had introduced.  Unlike the 1890-91  crisis, on this occasion 
Argentina did not need protection  from its own economic policy mistakes; 
instead it was volatility in external markets that disrupted local conditions, as 
war and uncertainty gripped the core. But the nature of the adverse shock, the 
reason for a reversal of capital flows, was not a contingency that the monetary 
rule took into consideration. The authorities had tied their hands, and watched 
from the sidelines as a massive gold drain imposed a large monetary contraction 
on the economy. True, a major devaluation of the currency was avoided, as had 
happened during the Baring Crisis, but the price was very high. The banking 
industry, which had by now got back on its feet, was again devastated.  Bank 
stock prices fell by 38 percent in one year, and there was a severe capital crunch 
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The dilemma is clear.  If such an external shock were to hit the economy, 
a financial crisis could start if economic agents began to panic and, doubting 
internal convertibility, tried to convert all  their deposits into currency.  If the 
Conversion Office were to act as a Lender of Last Resort to stave off the liq- 
uidity problem, this could feed a new run on bank deposits, but this time under 
doubts about external convertibility, with the public now rushing to convert 
peso deposits into specie. Thus, under this kind of “twin risk” scenario, the in- 
stitutional design was quite unforgiving and (deliberately) inflexible.24  Without 
a safety net, the Argentine monetary authorities were walking a most dangerous 
tightrope given the prevailing monetary and financial architecture. Would the 
currency board stand on the sidelines in any banking collapse of any magni- 
tude? The  1913-14crisis seemed to indicate they had the will to do exactly that. 
History soon presented a tougher test of their nerve when the world economy 
offered up its biggest external shock to date in the crisis of the 1930s. 
Toward Central Banking: Evolutionary Enhancements or Malign Mutations? 
Historically, many central banks around the world have emerged organically 
from large banks-bankers’  banks-or from specially privileged banks estab- 
lished by states as their fiscal agents with some monopolyrights in their charter?5 
Certainly, the Argentine landscape had some potential in this regard, given the 
early establishment of state banks in the nineteenth century. But these banks 
were provincial, not national, in their scope, and their capability to operate as 
prudent financial institutions was repeatedly compromised by the provinces’ 
desire to use them as agents for levying seigniorage. No truly national bank was 
chartered until after a federal system came into being. 
In our period of study the only state bank of any consequence was the Banco 
de la Nacion Argentina, which began life as the Banco Nacional in 1872. It 
was the major state bank and the fiscal agent of the federal government. After 
playing a key role in the abortive banking experiment of the late 188Os, it was 
liquidated during the Baring Crisis and refounded as the Banco de la Naci6n 
in 1891. It  remained the government’s principal fiscal agent and, having been 
cleaned up after the Baring Crisis, it emerged as Argentina’s most important 
commercial bank in the 1890s, a time when the financial crash had put almost 
every other bank was in dire straits. 
24. This is not to say that having a central bank can prevent all financial crises, as recent experience 
shows, and as the United States experience showed in the Great Depression. The  central bank 
must have a clear mission to assist banks in distress and it must discharge its responsibilities 
in that area, conditions that the 1930s Federal Reserve failed to satisfy, plunging the U.S. 
banking system into collapse. A Central Bank is not a sufficient condition for the prevention 
of banking crises. But absent an alternative fiscal source of banking insurance resources or a 
reliable private-sector insurance system-both  being elusive solutions in reality-it  is certainly 
a necessary condition. 
25.  For more on the evolution of central banks, see Goodhart (1988). 34  Straining at  the Anchor 
After the crisis, the government took great care and instituted strict policies 
to restrain the Banco de la Nacion by governing its level of reserves and limiting 
its rediscounting capacity with the government itself. Moreover, the Banco de 
la Naci6n and the Conversion Office were kept at arm’s length in an attempt to 
isolate two important functions. The responsibilities for note issues and their 
eventual convertibility-that  is, outside money and the problem of external 
convertibility-were  assigned to the Conversion Office. The state and com- 
mercial banlung activities-that  is, inside money and the problem of internal 
convertibility-were  to be the domain of the Banco de la Naci6n. It  was hoped 
that this separation of powers would constitute a more robust regime by keep- 
ing banking activity out of the purview of the institution that was ultimately 
responsible for the currency, with the goal of creating sufficient credibility to 
rejoin the gold standard. 
The clean separation was essentially maintained until the crisis of 1913-14 
when an emergency rediscount law was enacted, admitting much more flexibil- 
ity into the system. The Banco de la Nacion was authorized to rediscount the 
commercial obligations of other private banks, which at the same time could 
be rediscounted at the Conversion Office for cash.  In other words, the state 
bank now had the ability to act as Lender of Last Resort to the financial sys- 
tem, and the monetary authority had the power to finance such activity with 
money printing unbacked by gold.  In practice, what happened?  The Banco 
de la Nacion immediately began putting its new powers to use and started to 
extend rediscounts to other banks. But the Conversion Office shunned its new 
prerogative and kept money and gold synchronized on the margin for a long 
time.  In fact, as we shall see, the Conversion Office only put the rediscount 
provision into practice in the 1931  crisis to offset a severe gold drain.26 
This institutional path could not be described as the coherent evolution of 
a money and banking system toward a mature design built around a central 
bank.  In Argentina the idea of a central bank, and the concept of regulating 
and supervising the financial system, were foreign to the thinking of monetary 
authorities, as well as the banking community itself, at least until after the First 
World War?’  Yet from these conditions a central bank did emerge.  In April 
1931 the critical mutation of the monetary system occurred. The provisional 
26. At the provincial level, the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Ares had had certain currency 
board  features in earlier years, from 1867 to 1876, with the operation  of its own  internal 
Exchange Office (Oficina de Cambios). Note that this was a matter of provincial, not federal, 
money and banking policy at the time, and no national money then existed. See our discussion 
in the next chapter. 
27. For example, until 1935 there was no official policy regarding the level of reserves-the  rela- 
tionship between cash and deposits-that  should be maintained by  the private banks in the 
financial system.  No institution acted as  a Comptroller of the Currency, as in the United 
States, to supervise banking institutions.  Transparency and the dissemination of economic 
information were rare: before 1900, the Memorius de  Hacienda did not systematically include 
any consolidated monetary and banking statistics showing the condition of the banking system. Introduction  35 
government started to use the rediscount mechanism at the Conversion Office, 
allowing the currency board to finance the Banco de la Nacion’s Lender-of- 
Last-Resort activities by rediscounting commercial paper. The administration 
eventually convinced Congress to pass a law that gave  the government  the 
power to place state bonds-an  issue called the “Patriotic Loan”-directly  at 
the Conversion Office in exchange for cash. 
Beyond the Belle Epogue 
While a tacit spirit of laissez faire had guided the financial system for many 
years, the rise of central banking elsewhere in the world only added fuel to 
animated debates that soon sprang up over the best monetary policy regime for 
the country The Conversion Office did not survive the Great Depression: its 
functions were reorganized within a central bank proper in 1935 and along the 
way a massive bank bailout was engineered using the vast seigniorage receipts. 
The printing press, long quiescent, was humming again. 
After the fateful event ofApril  1931,  the genie was out ofthe  bottle. With the 
ink barely dry on the freshly printed notes as they left the monetary authority 
on their way to the state bank, and later the finance ministry, discretion had 
decisively replaced rules in monetary policy  The pretense of maintaining a 
metallic regime was over, credibility was soon spent, and a fiduciary regime had 
crept back in place. While perhaps understandable at the time, this reaction to 
a crisis had disastrous ramifications for subsequent Argentine economic history. 
What lessons does history have for us as we look back with the benefit of 
hindsight and what implications for present-day concerns?  The importance 
of consistent macroeconomic policies cannot be overstated. Fundamental eco- 
nomic contradictions  appeared in the Argentine system and were allowed to 
grow by a curious financial architecture which looked sound on the surface but 
was in poor shape at deeper levels. Here, the importance of institutional design 
is clear. Macroeconomic policy and bank behavior do not happen in a vacuum. 
One institutional contrast stands out at the center of our study. The Conver- 
sion Office succeeded in its mission for a very long time, thanks to an elegant 
and robust design. The Banco de la Nacion, on the other hand, was subject to 
weak oversight, and was repeatedly modifying its objectives and expanding its 
scope until it had bailed out almost the entire financial system and reduced its 
own balance sheet to a shambles. To save the bank, in the end, the convertibility 
plan had to be sacrificed. It  was a case, we might say, of bad institutions driving 
out good. Or, as is often asserted but rarely demonstrated in practice, it really 
does matter how your complete financial architecture is designed, from top to 
bottom: getting one element right, like the currency board, is no guarantee that 
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the institutions it built, and their inability to withstand certain kinds of shocks, 
Argentina was eventually due for some lund of serious macroeconomic setback. 
In this case it took a while, but slow declines sometimes offer more drama 
than instant collapses:  a process of gradual decay is  seen for  a while, only 
to be punctuated by a loud crash when a massive piece of the edifice cracks 
and falls apart.  Such a process invites the thicker descriptions and layers of 
analysis that the tools of modern economic history put at our disposal, and 
so our study employs formal econometrics and economic theory, exploits new 
quantitative data, evinces a sensitivity to institutional context, and explores a 
range of narrative sources. 
It is only with attention to the relationship between institutional structure, 
policy choices, and economic conditions that we can begin to offer an expla- 
nation of Argentina’s puzzling decline after the golden years at the turn of the 
twentieth century.  It was then one of the richest countries in the world, but 
its potential went to waste in the long run as a growing incoherence in poli- 
cies emerged. It is a sad but valuable story, a cautionary tale with much to say 
about today’s challenges for economic reform in developing countries. Argen- 
tine economic history demonstrates that prosperity in incomes and prosperity 
in institutions are two very different things. A failure in the second can be the 
undoing of the first. 